



TAX CREDIT AND BENEFIT
SYSTEMS
In light of high unemployment among less skilled
workers and the relatively low pay in the low-wage
sector, several Anglo-Saxon countries (and
Finland) give tax credits and wage-related trans-
fers to workers in this labour segment. Currently
the following systems are in force: Australia’s
Employment Entry Payment and Special Employ-
ment Advance, Finland’s Earned Income Tax
Credit, the U.K.’s Working Families’ Tax Credit,
Ireland’s multifaceted programme, Canada’s Child
Tax Benefit, New Zealand’s Family Tax Credit, and
the Earned Income Tax Credit of the United States
(OECD 1999a; OECD 1999b).
In all of these systems there is no guarantee of a
minimum standard of living. Rather, a current job
is required to claim these benefits. Only low-wage
earners generally qualify for the benefits,and here,
too, eligibility is primarily limited to families with
children. The limitation to the low-wage sector
means that, from a particular level of income, net
transfers are diminished and ultimately reduced to
zero. In this range the marginal charges on gross
income are very high. Benefits
are usually for an unlimited
period.
The Earned Income Tax Credit
in the United States
Probably the best known pro-
gramme to assist low-income
groups is the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) introduced
in the U.S.in 1975.2 Its goal is to
create financial incentives for low-wage earners
and boost their incomes.The programme was mod-
ified and considerably expanded in 1986, 1990 and
1993. Today, it is the most important measure for
combating poverty in the U.S.
The EITC is a tax credit that is granted under cer-
tain conditions to low-income households. The
beneficiaries are subject to federal income tax. If
the tax credit is higher than the income tax owed,
the difference is paid out to the eligible families.
Otherwise it is deducted from their income tax lia-
bility. EITC is administered by the Internal Re-
venue Service.
Employment is required for eligibility, and the
programme is primarily aimed at working people
with children.The amount of tax credit is based on
gross earnings. Figure 1 illustrates the three phas-
es of the EITC. Initially the tax credit rises in lin-
ear fashion with increasing income (phase I), then
it remains constant (phase II) and declines again
from a particular income level (phase III). The
amount of tax credit and the income levels differ
according to household type. Distinctions are
made as to families with two and more children,
families with one child, and people without chil-
dren. The highest benefit is given to families with
two or more children.
DICE REPORTS1
1 DICE = Database of Institutional
Comparison in Europe (www.cesifo.de).
2 The following is a description of the
programme at the federal level.
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The parameters of the EITC in 2000 are shown in the
table.For example,a family with two or more children
and an income between USD 1 and 9,720 receives a
tax credit of 40 cents on every dollar earned. With a
gross income of USD 9,720 the maximum credit of
$3,888 is reached. This remains constant until gross
income reaches USD 12,690. For every dollar earned
above USD 12,690, the tax credit is reduced by
21 cents.When gross income reaches USD 31,152,the
tax credit is reduced to 0. In the third phase in which
the tax credit is reduced, the marginal charge on
income is higher than the marginal rate of income tax.
In this phase of tax credit reduction the former
amounts to about 50%, as a rule (Gern 1996, p. 292;
Eissa and Liebman 1995, p. 34).
In 1998, 19.8 million workers (including 16.4 mil-
lion families with children) took advantage of
EITC. The tax credit amounted to an average of
USD 1,584 or USD 1870 for families with children
(Economic Report of the President 1999, Box 3.-3).
The Working Families’ Tax Credit in the United
Kingdom
The U.K. along with the U.S. has a long tradition of
assisting working people with low incomes. As far
back as 1971 a Family Income Supplement was
introduced.This was replaced in 1988 by the Family
Credit (FC).This in turn was replaced at the end of
1999 by the Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC).
Families with at least one child can claim the WFTC
as long as one adult works at least 16 hours a week.
The financial rules are quite similar to those of the
FC, but the benefits are more generous:
• The standard rate for adults is GBP 53.15 a week
(or GBP 2,763.80 a year) and for children,
depending on age, either GBP 25.60 or GBP
26.35 a week (or GBP 1,331.20 and GBP 1,370.20
a year). For work of 30 hours or more per week,
the benefits increase by GBP 11.25 a week.
• Although child care costs can no longer be
deducted in calculating net income, as was the
case for the Family Credit, up to 70% of child
care costs (up to certain upper levels) can be
used to increase the tax credit.
• In calculating net income for the WFTC, a stan-
dard deduction of GBP 91.45 a week (or GBP
4,755.40 a year) is allowed, and
• the withdrawal rate has been reduced from 70%
to 55% in comparison to the FC (Blundell,
Duncan, McCrae and Meghir 2000, pp. 77ff.;
Gregg, Johnson and Reed 1999, pp. 99f.;
Blundell 2000, pp. 27ff.
The more generous design of the WFTC is reflect-
ed in budget expenditures of GBP 5 billion a year
or GBP 1.5 billion more than was spent on the
Family Credit programme.
The Earned Income Tax Credit in Finland
The only non-Anglo Saxon country to introduce
an Earned Income Tax Credit is Finland. The
Finnish EITC is less generous than similar pro-
grammes in the U.S.and the U.K.The Finnish pro-
gramme is administered by the 450 municipalities.
They levy their own income tax, the proportional
tax rate of which averages 18%. (In individual
cases it ranges from 15% to 20%.) The EITC has
the following features: With a labour income of
FIM 15,000–49,000,20% of income can be deduct-
ed from the tax base of the municipal income tax.
At FIM 49,000 the maximum deduction of FIM
9,800 is reached. This remains constant up to an
income of FIM 75,000 (= 50% of average income).
Between FIM 75,000 and 355,000, the deduction
declines. From every finmark earned in excess of
FIM 75,000 3.5% is deducted from the maximum
tax deduction. When income reaches FIM
355,000, the deduction from the tax base is zero.
At a proportional tax rate of 18%, taxes saved
amount to 18% of the deduction from the tax
base.Taxes saved reach a maximum of FIM 1,764
(see Table and Figure 2).
Assisting low-income workers in Ireland
There are several programmes to assist low-income
workers in Ireland:
• the Back to Work Allowance (BTWA)
• the Family Income Supplement (FIS)
• the Continued Child Dependent Payment
(CCDP) and
• the Part Time Job Incentive (PTJI)
The objective of the Back to Work Allowance is to
create incentives to take on a job (Department of
Social Community and Family Affairs 1999).
Unemployed people who take on jobs can keep
part of the previous unemployment compensation
for a limited period of time.To claim BTWA bene-CESifo Forum 37
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fits, the person must be older than twenty-two,
unemployed for twelve months, and must have
received unemployment benefits amounting to at
least IRP 40 (singles) or IRP 62 (couples); addi-
tionally, a single parent who has received assis-
tance for twelve months also qualifies. Further-
more, by hiring these people the employer‘s total
number of jobs must have increased. Qualifying
people receive:
• 75% of their unemployment benefits during
their first year on the job,
• 50% in the second year,
• 25% in the third year (see Table).
The Family Income Supplement provides a benefit to
families that are employed in low-paying jobs (Callan,
O’Neill and O’Donoghue 1995). To qualify, employ-
ment must be for at least nineteen hours a week and
for a projected three months or
more. The working hours of a
married couple or partners may
be combined. The transfer pay-
ments amount to 60% of the dif-
ference between the net income
of the family (gross income
minus taxes and minus social
insurance contributions) and the
relevant income limit. This
increases to IRP 233 a week for
one child, IRP 253 for two chil-
dren,and up to a limit of IRP 355
for seven and more children.The
minimum benefit is IRP 10 a
week. At the end of 1999, 37,600
families claimed benefits under
BTWA and 14,500 under FSI.3
The Canada Child Tax Benefit
The assistance of working fami-
lies with children has a long tra-
dition in Canada. In 1993 the
Family Allowance was replaced
by the Child Tax Benefit which
was later supplemented by a
Working Income Supplement
for families with low incomes.At
the end of the 1990s both were
incorporated into the Canada
Child Tax Benefit (CCTB)
(Battle 1997, pp. 89ff.).
The CCTB contains the pay-
ment of child allowances. It
consists of basic benefits and
the National Child Benefit Supplement (NCBS)
for low-income families. The NCBS supplements
the basic benefits. It grants low-income families
CAD 785 per year for the first child, CAD 585 for
the second child and CAD 510 for each additional
child.Above a net income of CAD 20,921,the child
allowance is reduced for each additionally earned
dollar by 11.5% for families with one child, 20.1%
(two children) and 27.5% (three children). At an
income level of about CAD 27,750, entitlement for
child allowances within the NCBS ends (see
Table). Figure 3 shows that a family with one child
and a low income receives CAD 1,805 in child
allowances a year. Above a net income of CAD
25,921, child allowances first decline rapidly and
Figure 2
3 For an explanation of CCDP and PTJI, see Department of Social
and Community Affairs.
Figure 3CESifo Forum 38



















later, after the NCBS runs out, at a slower pace.
The CCTB is claimed by 3.2 million Canadian fam-
ilies accounting for 80% of all children (Depart-
ment of Finance 2000).
Australia’s Employment Entry Payment and
Special Employment Advance; New Zealand’s
Family Tax Credit
In contrast to the aforementioned systems,
Australia focuses on the transition from jobless-
ness to employment.When an unemployed person
takes on a job, he receives AUD 100 under the
Employment Entry Payment scheme. As an alter-
native, a Special Employment Advance can also be
claimed. It includes the payment of expenses
involved in assuming work up to a maximum of
AUD 500.4
With its Family Tax Credit, New Zealand supple-
ments the net income of low-income families. For
family incomes that are less than NZD 286 a week
or NZD 14,872 a year after taxes, the difference is
transferred by the tax authorities. To claim the
Family Tax Credit, one parent must work. Single
parents must work twenty hours a week. Partners
must work a total of at least thirty hours a week.
Each partner receives 50% of the transfer pay-
ments (see Table).5
Effect on income and employment
The objective of granting tax credits and job-linked
transfers is to increase the net incomes in the low-
income range and the labour supply. The income
objective is largely met by these systems. In the
United States half of all EITC payments go to fam-
ilies with incomes below the poverty level. It is
estimated that EITC lifted 4.3 million people
above the poverty level and made an important
contribution to preventing child poverty
(Economic Report of the President 2000). The
WTFC in the United Kingdom and the NCBS in
Canada especially help families at the bottom of
the income pyramid. Only the FSI in Ireland and
the EITC in Finland appear to help other groups
besides low-income recipients. The income-related
withdrawal rates as well as a cut-off income level
assure that the benefits go to the deserving. This
also constrains budget expenditures.
In contrast to the income effects, the impact of the
employment subsidies on labour supply and (given
sufficient demand) on employment in the low-
wage sector is not straightforward. To be sure, the
increase in net incomes and the accompanying
increase in the wage differential create work incen-
tives. On the other hand, the high marginal charges
on income in the transfer withdrawal range cause
those with jobs to work fewer hours (effect on
hours worked). There is thus a trade-off between
the likelihood of participation and the effect on
hours worked. Both effects appear to offset each
other in terms of the total number of man-hours
supplied.
Empirical studies show that the effects on the
labour supply differ according to the design of the
assistance system and the family situation of the
beneficiaries. In the United States, the EITC has
given single mothers a strong incentive to work.
There has been little impact on the labour-market
participation of married men, whereas the partici-
pation of married women has declined slightly.The
latter effect may be the result of the fact that the
EITC is linked not to individual incomes but to the
labour income of the family, so that it becomes
unattractive for married women (with employed
husbands) to take on jobs because of the high mar-
ginal charges on income in the withdrawal phase.
The working behaviour of those with jobs is also
affected in various ways. Whereas the hours
worked by married women, and also by married
men, have declined, the hours of single mothers
have remained stable. In conclusion, the employ-
ment/workforce ratio has been raised by the EITC,
working hours supplied have been reduced, and
the total number of man-hours worked have
increased slightly.
The WFTC in the United Kingdom provides a
strong work incentive.The only contrary effect con-
cerns married women with a working partner.
Labour participation is estimated to have increased
by 30,000 as a result of the WFTC. On the other
hand, the high marginal charges on income for
weekly working times in excess of 16 hours provides
a strong incentive to work only 16 hours a week.
In assessing these results, it must be kept in mind
that the negative indirect employment effects that
4 See http://www.centrelink.gov.au.
5 See http://www.ird.govt.nz/famiasst/famiasst.htm.CESifo Forum 41
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have been caused by the financing of these pro-
grammes from general tax revenues have not been
included. If these were taken into consideration,
the small increase in employment would be
reduced further.6 Wolfgang Ochel
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